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Essay
Summary Judgment: What We Think We Know
Versus What We Ought To Know
Brooke D. Coleman*
The twenty-fifth anniversary of the "trilogy" of summary judgment
cases provides a perfect moment to reflect on what summary judgment
means to our civil justice system. However, it goes without saying that
summary judgment is not one of those procedural topics that has
received little attention. Indeed, it is an area of procedure that has
produced heated debates, plenty of press, and volumes of law review
articles.' So, this is not a little-studied area that only gets discussed on
these landmark occasions. This leads to the following inquiry: What
more can really be written about a topic that appears to be so saturated?
It is a good question, but I, and many others, including the participants
in this Colloquium, believe that there is much more work to be done.
However, while we might agree on the need for further work, our
reasons for holding this belief undoubtedly diverge. My reason flows
from the observation that what has been done so far, while making an
important contribution, does not begin to tell us what the true effect of
summary judgment is on potential and actual litigants.
Empirical work in the area of summary judgment tells us a lot about
how measured filing rates and grant rates for summary judgment
motions have increased or decreased over time. 2 We also have a
breadth of academic work that discusses the advantages of the
process-namely, efficiency and the correlated cost-savings. 3 There is
* Assistant Professor at Seattle University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A.,
The University of Arizona. Many thanks to the participants in this Colloquium, to Seattle
University School of Law for sponsoring the event, and to the Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal for publishing this great collection of work.
1. See infra Parts I II (illustrating the wealth of information analyzing summary judgment
from studies and articles focusing on various courts).
2. See infra Parts L.A and I.B (comparing the rates at which motions for summary judgment
have been filed and awarded among various district courts between 1976 2000 and in 2006).
3. See infra Part II.B (highlighting that a substantial number of scholars have positive
criticism about the summary judgment process, including its focus on efficiency and bringing
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also a collection of work that defends that process on theoretical
grounds.4 In contrast to that work, many academics have maligned the
process for its unfairness in application, as well as for its affront to the
constitutional right to a jury trial in a civil case. 5 Add to that the work
that has been done about the technical aspects of the rule and how the
procedure functions in practice, 6 and it is easy to see that there is an
entire body of work that has been done about summary judgment. So,
what is missing?
This Essay argues that a key inquiry is missing: a systematic study of
what is happening in summary judgment on the ground. In other words,
what we do not know, but ought to know, is whether summary
judgment sifts out meritorious cases and at what rate. We also need to
know how the summary judgment process deters individuals with
meritorious claims from filing. And, we need to know this information
across the board, at both the state and federal level. The point of this
Essay is to show that we think we know the answers to these questions
based on the body of work that currently exists. While this body of
work informs these inquiries, it does not answer them. This Essay
argues that the use of this existing work to make principled arguments
about the pros and cons of summary judgment will always fall short.
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I briefly chronicles and explains
the empirical data that we have about summary judgment, highlighting
two key studies that explored the rates at which motions for summary
judgment are filed and subsequently granted. Part I also includes a brief
discussion of the work regarding how Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure ("Rule 56") technically functions. Part IT similarly
discusses the body of theoretical work that has been written,
highlighting the leading articles from those who support summary
judgment and those who criticize it. Part III then argues why this work
does not tell us what we ought to know. While the empirical work tells
us a lot, it does not tell us anything about the chilling effect of the
summary judgment process, nor does it tell us whether and how many
meritorious cases are wrongly dismissed. As for the theoretical work,
much of it uses particular cases to support a broader argument about
how summary judgment is functioning. This kind of work provides an
only meritorious claims to trial).
4. Id.
5. See infra Part II.A (pointing out that summary judgment since the "trilogy" has made it
easier for defendants to succeed on those motions, resulting in possible constitutional
deprivations of a right to a jury trial for the plaintiff).
6. See infra Part I.C (describing one article's focus on the controversial decision of Scott v.
Harris involving the application of summary judgment).
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interesting entrde into thinking about what might be going right or
wrong in practice, but it certainly does not tell us anything that is
meaningful systemically. Finally, Part IV suggests different ways to
figure out the answer to what we ought to know, including a call for
more detailed empirical studies, as well as different types of qualitative
work. These suggestions are made, however, with the acknowledgment
that some of this information is simply unknowable. This Essay
concludes that because the information needed to make principled
arguments may not be obtainable, the debate about summary judgment
should be more transparent-one either favors the jury trial or one does
not.
1. MAJOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT
There have been a number of studies about the effect of summary
judgment.7 The Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") conducted the two
highlighted in this Essay.8 These studies were chosen because they
were conducted in response to requests from the federal civil
rulemaking committees. In other words, policymakers commissioned
these studies, and academics and policymakers alike have heavily relied
on them when debating the benefits and costs of summary judgment.
Also discussed is the only study I am aware of that critically looks at the
Supreme Court's decision in a summary judgment case by studying how
different racial and economic groups might have decided such a case.9
Finally, I summarize the work that has been done regarding the
technical aspects of Rule 56.
A. Federal Judicial Center Study: "Trends in Summary Judgment
Practice: 1975-2000"
Critics of the "trilogy" accused it of increasing the number of
summary judgment motions made and granted. Yet, there was no real
data to support or contravene this argument. Based on this lack of
information, the FJC took on an ambitious study to answer this
question.' 0 Its inquiry focused on the following questions:
7. See infra Part I and accompanying notes 8 50 (describing the empirical studies the FJC
conducted between 1976 2000 and later in 2006).
8. See infra Part LA and I.B (comparing two studies the FJC conducted that investigated
summary judgment activity between 1975-2000 and in 2006).
9. See infra Part I.C (discussing how the Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. Harris caused
different effects and perceptions among various minority groups).
10. Joe S. Cecil et al.. A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal
District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861. 863 (2007), available at http://
ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/jelsl207.pdf; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and
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Have motions for summary judgment increased since 1975? Are
motions for summary judgment more likely to be granted since 1975?
Are cases more likely to be terminated by summary judgment since
1975? If summary judgment practice has changed over time, are
changes in summary judgment practice limited to certain courts or to
certain types of cases?"
To say the study was ambitious may have been an understatement.
The study examined filings in six different federal district courts. 12
These six districts were responsible for terminating 20% of the civil
cases filed in federal district courts in 2000, so the selected courts
provided a broad view of practice.13 The basic approach of the study
was to sample different cases across the districts and compare summary
judgment activity across six time periods: cases terminated in 1975,
1986, 1988, 1989, 1995, and 2000.14 The idea behind this approach was
to see whether there was a spike in summary judgment activity
following the 1986 trilogy. In other words, the premise was to see
whether the rates of motions filed and granted increased before or after
the Supreme Court decided the trilogy of cases, and, more importantly,
to see whether these rates increased at all. 15
The study found the following: the rate of summary judgment motion
practice in filed cases increased from 12 %  in 1975, to 1 7 % in 1986, and
to 19% in 1988.16 The rate of motions granted in whole or in part
Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 620 (2004) (arguing that the rate of summary judgment motions
increased before the trilogy of cases).
11. Cecil et al., supra note 10, at 873-74 (describing the study as a review of docket sheets
across a variety of district courts in order to craft a well-rounded answer to summary judgment
questions).
12. These districts included: the District of Maryland, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
the Southern District of New York. the Eastern District of Louisiana. the Central District of
California, and the Northern District of Illinois. Id. at 874. The study noted that three of the
districts were chosen because of past studies where the FJC had data regarding those districts
from a separate study of case management. Id. The remaining three districts were chosen
because of their reputation for restrictively applying summary judgment. Id.
13. Id. at 875.
14. Id. at 875-76. Each of the time periods covered twelve consecutive months. Id. at 875.
The time period before the trilogy of cases was chosen to provide a benchmark for summary
judgment practice before those cases came down. Id The study chose to look at 1986 because
that was the year the Supreme Court decided the trilogy. Id. The study noted, however, that
practitioners' responses to Supreme Court decisions would not be immediate, so it also tested
1988 and 1989 to better determine the effect, if any, of the trilogy. Id. Finally, the study selected
1995 and 2000 in order to determine whether the trilogy had an effect once those cases had been
fully integrated into practice. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 883.
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increased from 6% in 1975 to 12% in 2000.17 The percentage of cases
that summary judgment terminated similarly doubled from 4% in 1975
to 8% in 2000.is
As to the first set of numbers regarding filing rates, the study
concluded that the rate actually increased prior to the trilogy of cases,
and that while the rate held steady until 2000, it did not increase to any
great degree.' 9 In 2000, the rate of filing summary judgment motions
was 210%--hardly the huge increase one might expect if she were
arguing that the trilogy encouraged defendants to file summary
judgment motions more often. 20
Regarding the last two sets of numbers-the increase in grant rates
and termination rates-the study noted that the rates varied greatly over
time and between courts. 21 Thus, for some courts, the rate increased
between 1975 and 2000, but for other courts, the largest increase was
between more narrow time periods, such as between 1975 and 1986.22
The study used this variance in time periods to argue that there was no
statistical proof that the trilogy had caused this increase.
The study also looked at the frequency of summary judgment
motions across different types of substantive claims, and it found that
the rate of summary judgment motions filed increased most
dramatically in civil rights cases. 23 However, it also compared these
motion rates to the general frequency with which those particular types
of cases were filed. 24 The study argued it was possible to find that the
higher rate of summary judgment motions in civil rights cases was due
to a proportional increase in those types of cases overall, and not due to
a spike in summary judgment motions across the board.25
Finally, the study looked at grant rates for defendants' summary
judgment motions over time. First, it looked at the number generally,
finding that defendants won their summary judgment motions 40% of
the time in 1986, but won 47% of the time in 1988.26 Thus, there was a
spike following the trilogy. But the study also found that the rates
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 882.
21. Id. at 883.
22. Id. at 883-84.
23. Id. at 885.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 887.
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evened out until they spiked again in 2000 to 49%.27 This led the study
to question whether the trilogy caused the 1988 spike or not. Second,
the study looked at defendants' success by type of substantive case.28
The study found that there was a difference-defendants won in civil
rights cases almost 60% of the time, but only won in torts cases 40% of
the time. 29  Similar to the rate of motion practice discussed above,
however, the study posited that this difference in grant rates between
types of cases might have simply been a consequence of the
proportional increase in the filing of civil rights cases overall. 30
B. Federal Judicial Center Study: "Estimates of Summary Judgment
Activity in Fiscal Year 2006"
In this study, the FJC analyzed the results of summary judgment
cases that were filed in seventy-eight federal district courts for the fiscal
year 2006.31 It looked again at how many summary judgment motions
were filed, and it found that the activity ranged from 7% to 3 4%, with
an average of 17% across all courts. 32 The motions granted per court
did not vary as much. The grant rate average was 60%, with a range
from 55% to 68%.33 Finally, the study found that summary judgment
motion grant rates varied by substantive area, with contract cases at the
low end at 5 3 %, and civil rights cases at the high end at 70%.34 More
specifically, the study found that the grant rate for employment
discrimination cases was one of the highest at 73%.35
The study was relatively small, so the researchers did not posit
theories behind the numbers to any great degree. They did note,
however, that in the districts where there were high rates of summary
judgment motions for employment discrimination cases, many of those
districts had alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") procedures that the
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 888.
31. Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort. The Fed. Judicial Ctr.. to Hon. Michael
Baylson 1 (Apr. 12. 2007. rev. June 15, 2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/sujufy06.pdf/$file/sujufy06.pdf. The study only looked at seventy-eight summary
judgment cases because those courts fully implemented the federal courts' electronic filing
system (CM/ECF). Id.
32. Id. at 1, 3.
33. Id. at 1, 3-4.
34. Id. at 6-7.
35. Id. at 6. Looking district by district, the study found that some district courts granted
summary judgment motions in employment discrimination cases as much as 95% of the time. Id.
at 10.
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parties used to resolve their cases before the defendant could file a
summary judgment motion. 36 The implication of this qualification was
that the cases that made it past ADR were less likely to be meritorious,
and thus, more prone to summary judgment.
C. Testing the Application of Summary Judgment
To my knowledge, there is only one study that has tested the
application of summary judgment in a particular case by asking lay
people to assess the evidence like a jury. 37 That article, Whose Eyes Are
You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive
Il1iberalism, took on the Court's controversial summary judgment
decision in Scott v. Harris.38 That case involved the question of
whether a police officer used excessive force when he rammed Victor
Harris's car off the road in order to stop a high-speed car chase. 39 The
accident rendered Harris a quadriplegic. 40 The issue was whether the
video footage of the car chase demonstrated that Officer Scott used
reasonable force to meet the danger Harris presented.4 1 The Supreme
Court, in an eight-to-one decision, found that he did and granted
summary judgment in Scott's favor.42
In the study, the authors showed the video of the police chase to a
cross-section of the American public and asked them what they
thought.43  The study determined that while a majority of the
participants agreed with the Court's finding, a substantial number of
participants-predominantly from marginalized groups-did not agree
with the Court's determination. 44 From this, the study determined that
the Court was not malicious in its inability to see other perspectives, but
was simply blinded by its "cognitive illiberalism." 45 The author's
36. Id. at 2.
37. But see Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV.
141, 143 (2000) (reviewing appellate summary judgment cases from 1973-1978 and determining
that the "variety of cases and situations in which federal courts granted summary judgment
widened over the study period").
38. Dan M. Kahan et al.. Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils
of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009).
39. Id. at 839.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 855.
42. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374 (2007).
43. Kahan et al., supra note 38, at 841.
44. Id. at 903 ("These patterns suggest the influence of value-motivated cognition.
Comprising several discrete mechanisms, value-motivated cognition refers to the tendency of
people to resolve factual ambiguities in a manner that generates conclusions congenial to self-
defining values.").
45. Id. at 905.
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solution to this problem was to encourage the Court to exercise judicial
humility, but also to study more about how to understand and decrease
the effect of cultural values on how individuals view facts.46
Adding to this work, Jeffrey Stempel's article for this Colloquium,
Taking Cognitive Iliberalism Seriously: Judicial Humility, Aggregate
Efficiency, and Acceptable Justice, argues that this criticism of
summary judgment should not just be limited to our inability to
recognize our bias against "others," but should be broadened to account
for our inability to recognize that even individuals who share particular
traits can see facts so differently. 47  Stempel's piece also looks at the
rates at which summary judgment grants are overturned on appeal to
argue that district courts all too often wrongly decide such motions.48
D. Technical Aspects of Summary Judgment
In addition to the FJC's empirical studies, scholars have also written
about the technical aspects of the summary judgment process itself.
This work has ranged from discussions about the judge's discretion to
deny summary judgment because of the word "shall" in Rule 5649 to
articles like those by Linda Mullenix in this Colloquium that look at
whether courts truly engage in the complex procedural burden shifting
provided by Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.50 Finally, scholars like Adam
Steinman have attempted to reconcile pre-trilogy summary judgment
procedures with those post-trilogy, at least in the context of burden
shifting under Celotex.51
46. See id. ("We have proposed a form of judicial humility as one technique for ameliorating
such conflict. But such a strategy. we concede, will on its own make only a modest contribution
to this end. Much more attention to solving the problem of cognitive illiberalism is needed, in
both the legal and the political domains.").
47. Jeffrey W. Stempel. Taking Cognitive Illiberalism Seriously: Judicial Humility, Aggregate
Efficiency, and Acceptable Justice. 43 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 627. 636 (2012); see also Michael J.
Kaufman, Summary Pre-Judgment: The Supreme Court's Profound, Pervasive, and Problematic
Presumption ahout Human Behavior, 43 LoY. U. CHEI L.J. 593, 595 (2012) (arguing that judges
should not presume rational human behavior when assessing claims on summary judgment).
48. Stempel, supra note 47, at 650-53.
49. Steven S. Gensler, Must, Should, Shall, 43 AKRON L. REv. 1139, 1142 (2010).
50. Linda S. Mullenix, The 25th Anniversary of the Summary Judgment Trilogy: Much Ado
About Very Little. 43 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 561. 568-72 (2012); see also Brooke D. Coleman, The
Celotex Initial Burden Standard and an Opportunity to "Revivify" Rule 56, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 295,
311 (2008) (finding that a study of cases filed in the Northern District of California demonstrated
the courts generally did not strictly adhere to. nor apply. the burden shifting provided for in
Celotex).
51. Adam Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment
Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy. 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 85-86 (2006); see also
James Joseph Duane, The Four Greatest Myths About Summary Judgment, 52 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1523, 1554-62 (1995) (articulating and dispelling myths about summary judgment in the
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II. MAJOR THEORETICAL WORK IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The academic work about summary judgment is voluminous-thus, it
is impossible to represent the breadth and quality of that work in this
Essay. The goal is to highlight some of the notable work that has
focused on certain emerging themes. First, the scholarship is crudely
distinguished by whether it is critical of summary judgment or
supportive of summary judgment. 52 From there, this Essay highlights
the main arguments made in the twenty-five years since the trilogy was
decided.
A. Critical Summary Judgment Scholarship
Criticism from scholars began the moment the Court decided the
trilogy. Some of the criticism was about the confusing nature of the
opinions and how they might have negative implications for litigants.
For example, scholars, like Jeff Stempel, argued that the Court simply
got the decisions wrong, both historically and as a matter of precedent.53
He also argued that the civil rulemaking body should get involved by
fixing the Court's mistakes.54  Other scholars have similarly criticized
the trilogy opinions on the basis that the Court was mistaken.55
Much of the criticism that followed these initial reactions focused
more on the effect of the trilogy once, as scholars argued, it increased
the frequency and use of summary judgment. A substantial portion of
this critique has been based on the notion that the trilogy made it easier
for defendants to succeed on summary judgment. This work principally
argues that it takes a function away from the jury (unconstitutionally or
otherwise), 56 leaves too much discretion to judges, 57 and is a pro-
wake of the trilogy of cases).
52. The scholarship is, of course. more nuanced than just taking a position that is supportive
or critical of summary judgment. Much of the work that is critical of summary judgment
acknowledges that there are also positive aspects of it, and vice versa for the scholarship that is
categorized as critical. This admittedly artificial separation of the scholarship allows this Essay to
better critique the methodologies and arguments made on all sides of the summary judgment
debate, but it is not meant to suggest that the work discussed is that simple and binary.
53. Jeffrey W. Stempel. A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 99
(1988).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Melissa Nelken. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment After
Celotex, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 66 (1988) (criticizing the Court's misreading of the record in
Celotex and arguing that its language regarding the use of inadmissible evidence creates
confusion).
56. See, e.g.. Suja Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional 93 VA. L. REv. 139.
142-43 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment is unconstitutional because there was no
procedure like summary judgment under the common law in 1791).
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defendant measure. 58 One piece that is often cited as rounding out this
premise is Arthur Miller's article, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are
the "Litigation Explosion, " "Liability Crises, " and Efficiency Clichis
Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?59 In that
article, Miller chronicles the abuses that he argues occur in summary
judgment motions, and to support his argument, he highlights
particularly offensive cases. 60
There is also a good amount of literature that more specifically
theorizes that there is a bias in the summary judgment process because
of a plaintiffs gender, race, sexuality, or other category. For instance,
Elizabeth Schneider, in The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender
and Federal Civil Litigation, argues that gender bias makes summary
judgment unfair in application. 61 By looking at the effect of gender in a
select number of cases across different substantive areas, Schneider
concludes that gender unfairly affects judicial decision-making. 62
Similarly, in my recent article, The Vanishing Plaintiff I also theorize
that particular types of plaintiffs are impacted more harshly by
restrictive procedural rules, including summary judgment.63  With
respect to summary judgment, I argue that my "vanishing plaintiff' has
a more difficult time surviving summary judgment for at least two
reasons. 64 First, her claim is often marginal, in the sense that there is a
conscious or unconscious hostility to it, requiring a full opportunity to
advance her complete narrative.65 Yet, the summary judgment process
necessarily cuts off this cohesive narrative by presenting facts and
57. See, e.g.. Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty. 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897. 1942
(1998) (reviewing a sample of decisions from the D.C. Circuit and determining that "judges will
stretch to make summary judgment apply even in borderline cases, which, a decade ago, might
have been thought indisputably trial-worthy").
58. See, e.g.. John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 522. 539-
43 (2007) (arguing summary judgment is pro-defendant).
59. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion,"
"Liability Crises," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?. 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1047 (2003).
60. Id. at 1065-72. Miller also uses the studies discussed in this Essay, among other similar
studies, to determine that summary judgment rates are increasing drastically for particular
substantive areas and modestly in the aggregate. Id. at 1048-56.
61. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REv. 705, 737 38, 757 (2007).
62. Id. at 714-15.
63. Brooke D. Coleman. The Vanishing Plaintiff 42 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming
2012). available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1908359.
64. Id. (manuscript at 21).
65. Id.
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arguments piecemeal. 66 Second, her claim is often one based on her
identity-race, sexual orientation, gender, or other-but the reality is
that the judge hearing the case does not share any of these attributes
with her.67 There is no common identity between her and the person
judging her like there might be if she were before a jury. 68
In addition to work that is directly critical of summary judgment,
there is a body of scholarship that responds to the proponents of
summary judgment. Most of this work responds to the notion that
summary judgment makes the civil justice system more efficient. For
example, John Bronsteen, in Against Summary Judgment,69 argues that
summary judgment creates three distinct moments in litigation (early
settlement, summary judgment, and trial) when without it, there would
be only two moments (early settlement and trial). 70 The thrust of this
argument is that the three moments actually make litigation more costly
than it would be with only two. 71 More recently, Judge Diane Wood
questioned the alleged cost-savings achieved through summary
judgment by arguing that parties spend more on discovery than they
might otherwise without such abounding access to the process. 72
Finally, bridging the gap between the proponents and critics of
summary judgment, scholars like Martin Redish have tried to balance
the pros and the cons of the process by measuring the procedure against
66. Id.
67. Id. (manuscript at 22 23).
68. Id. (manuscript at 23). Many other scholars have done fantastic work in other substantive
areas, but have also relied on a selection of cases to support their viewpoints. See, e.g.. Deseriee
A. Kennedy, Processing Civil Rights Summary Judgment and Consumer Discrimination Claims.
53 DEPAUL L. REv. 989, 1002 11 (2004) (looking at how summary judgment does not function
well in consumer discrimination claims under the Civil Rights Act); Ann McGinley, Credulous
Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA
Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 233-41 (1993) (criticizing the use of summary judgment in the
context of civil rights and ADEA cases).
69. Bronsteen, supra note 58, at 522.
70. Id. at 532.
71. See id. at 532-33 ("[I]n most cases the cost of litigating to summary judgment exceeds the
cost of settling early by a greater amount than the cost of trial exceeds the cost of litigating to
summary judgment. In other words, summary judgment is more expensive than trial."): see also
Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100
YALE L.J. 73, 100-03 (1990) (using economic modeling to argue that increased use of summary
judgment might actually discourage settlement, a moment thought to be efficient in our civil
justice system).
72. See Hon. Diane P. Wood, Summary Judgment and the Law of Unintended Consequences,
36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 231. 243-45. 250 (2011) (suggesting that to decrease the amount of
resources spent on discovery in advance of summary judgment, the rules could require the party
moving for summary judgment to seek permission from the judge before filing the motion).
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a neutral benchmark. 73 In his essay Summary Judgment and the
Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, Redish argues
that there are benefits to the summary judgment process that should
require the system to lower what he calls "external barriers" into the
process. 74 But he also argues that such benefits should be countered
with lower "internal barriers" for the plaintiff when responding to a
summary judgment motion-to the extent a jury could draw an
inference in her favor, she should be able to survive the motion for
summary judgment. 75
B. Supportive Summary Judgment Scholarship
The scholarship about summary judgment is not all critical. There
are a number of scholars that have argued that it is an appropriate
process, most notably because of the efficiencies it creates. Ed Brunet's
piece for this Colloquium is but one example. 76 Brunet argues that
efficiencies like the "summary judgment premium" (Brunet's term for
the argument that if the defendant loses the summary judgment motion,
the plaintiff will get more in settlement) and fact clarification are worth
focusing on when discussing the positive effects of summary
judgment.77  He also argues that the motion creates a "wake-up"
moment for the parties and the judge. 78 In other words, the motion
73. Martin H. Redish. Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the
Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1330 31 (2005).
74. Id. at 1347-48.
75. See id. at 1355 ("Thus. where plaintiffs present affirmative evidence from which a
reasonable factfinder could infer that the facts are as alleged, summary judgment should be
denied. This is so, even though it would be just as reasonable to draw the opposite inference.
That it would be just as reasonable to believe that the facts happened as the defendant claims as it
is to accept the plaintiffs factual allegations is not an automatic basis for taking the case from the
jury.").
76. Edward Brunet, The Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 689, 690
(2012).
77. Id. at 691-92, 694-95; see also Edward Brunet. Six Summary Judgment Safeguards. 43
AKRON L. REv. 1165, 1165 (2010) (arguing that summary judgment will not be abused because
of the following six safeguards: "(1) the discretionary ability of the trial judge to deny summary
judgment by identifying a single disputed factual issue; (2) robust de novo appellate review
(3) a liberal ability to call a helpful 'time-out' available under Rule 56[d] to take a focused
quantum of discovery essential to combat a summary judgment request . . . [the possibility of]
[(4)] the weighing of inferences favoring the non-movant; [(5)] allowing the non-movant to
introduce inadmissible evidence; and [(6)] a 'handle with care' label applicable to only selected
types of cases . . .").
78. See Brunet. supra note 76, at 693 (suggesting that a summary disposition motion requires
a judge to "wake up" from previous procedural inaction and actively participate by hearing and
ruling on the motion).
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forces the parties to engage in the litigation and, even more importantly,
forces the judge to manage that litigation more efficiently. 79
This line of argument has been a constant one since the Court decided
the trilogy. When the trilogy came down, scholars defended the
decisions on the basis that it would empower judges to grant summary
judgment in cases where it was justified. Jack Friedenthal, in Cases on
Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?,
argued that the efficiencies to be gained from summary judgment would
benefit all litigants.80 According to Friedenthal, if judges were able to
dismiss meritless cases at summary judgment, it would free up more
time for those same judges to attend to meritorious claims.81 Similarly,
William Schwarzer, in Summary Judgment and Case Management,
argued that the process has great benefits. 82  Similar to Brunet's
argument that summary judgment creates a "wake-up" litigation
moment, Schwarzer argued that even if the parties did not file a
summary judgment motion, forcing parties to think through the
potential motion would focus them and the court on the disputed
issues.83
This defense of summary judgment has continued. For example,
Schwarzer later wrote that
[s]ummary judgment has become recognized not only as a procedure
for avoiding unnecessary trials on insufficient claims or defenses but
also as an effective case management device to identify and narrow
79. See id
80. Jack Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in
Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770, 771 (1988).
81. See id. at 771 ("It is important to see, whether, in an era of increasing litigation costs and
the consequent maneuverings by parties which are more related to their assets than to the strength
of their legal arguments, the legal system gives too little credence to a procedural device that has
the potential for providing just results in many cases and which could leave judicial resources free
to concentrate on those actions for which a trial is required.").
82. See William W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment and Case Management, 56 ANTITRUST
L.J. 213, 220 (1987) ("The summary judgment procedure has utility in nearly every case . . .
[a]ttorneys should therefore have Rule 56 in mind in nearly all cases from the outset of
litigation.").
83. See id. ("The summary judgment procedure has utility in nearly every case, both as an
offensive and a defensive tactic. Even if no motion is filed, thinking through the analytic process.
as illustrated by the discussion in the preceding section. helps sort out the legal and factual issues
and define with precision the scope of the controversy. If a motion is made, whether or not
granted. it affords court and counsel a useful vehicle for narrowing the controversy, identifying
issues to be decided, and structuring the litigation for efficient and economic disposition.") see
also Thomas D. Lambros, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A New Adversarial Modelfor a
New Era. 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 789. 794 (1989) ("In 1986. the spirit of judicial management and
control evinced in the 1983 amendments was given greater vitality in the Supreme Court's
analyses of summary judgment in [the trilogy of cases].").
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issues. The Supreme Court had it right almost ninety years ago when
it said summary judgment "prescribes the means of making an issue."
Properly used, summary judgment helps strip away the underbrush
and lay bare the heart of the controversy between the parties. 84
To be fair, Schwarzer also deftly noted that "proper use of the rule is the
sine qua non of its utility," but he also wholeheartedly credited that the
rule created systemic efficiencies. 85
Indeed, this efficiency assumption undergirds every argument in
favor of summary judgment in the literature today. In many articles, the
underlying assumption is that current summary judgment practice is
efficient, such that additional and innovative uses of the procedure
would only be more beneficial. For example, Randy Kozel and David
Rosenberg, in Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem:
Mandatory Summary Judgment,86 argue that requiring the adjudication
of a summary judgment motion before settlement would eliminate
plaintiffs' incentives to use "nuisance-value strategies." 87 The authors
explain that a plaintiff employs a nuisance-value strategy when it
"asserts a plainly meritless claim . . . in order to extract a payoff based
on the cost the other party would incur to have the claim . .. dismissed
by the court [at] summary judgment."88 Kozel and Rosenberg assert
that if a summary judgment motion is required before a settlement can
occur, plaintiffs will be deterred from filing frivolous claims.89 The
cost of enduring the summary judgment process will dissuade them
from bringing the claims in the first place; thus, the authors argue
mandatory summary judgment would create greater efficiencies. 90
Jonathan T. Molot also argues for the potential efficiencies from the
increased use of summary judgment in his article, How Changes in the
Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil Procedure.91 Molot suggests
that Rule 56 should be amended to require judges to explain why they
denied a motion for summary judgment because such an evaluation of
84. WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER. ALAN HIRSCH & DAVID BARRANS, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE
ANALYSIS AND DECISION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS 8 (1991) (quoting Fid. & Deposit
Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902)).
85. Id. Schwarzer looked at a collection of cases in different substantive areas, and argued
that on the whole, the courts got the summary judgment decision right. Id. at 21-37.
86. Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg. Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem:
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REv. 1849 (2004).
87. Id. at 1853.
88. Id. at 1850.
89. Id. at 1862-64.
90. Id. at 1902.
91. Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil
Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955 (1998).
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the merits by a judge would lead to more accurate settlements. 92 Like
Kozel and Rosenberg, Molot is concerned about plaintiffs that bring
weak claims. 93 His baseline assumption is that summary judgment is a
procedure that is required to weed out these types of suits. 94 Forcing a
judge to explain why she would deny a motion in every case would,
according to Molot, go even further in achieving the efficiency potential
of summary judgment because parties would have a clearer sense of the
quality of their arguments. 95
THI. WHY THIS WORK DOES NOT TELL US WHAT WE OUGHT To KNOW
The studies and scholarship that are supportive and critical of
summary judgment cannot fairly be represented in any work, but the
previous section has chronicled some of the high points in the discourse.
There is a lot to learn from what has been written. Yet, it must also be
acknowledged that there is still so much that we do not know.
For example, the FJC studies96 are often cited by rule makers and
summary judgment proponents to argue that the filing rates and grant
rates following the trilogy did not increase greatly. It is true that, on
their face, the rates only modestly increased, and now appear to have
evened out. 97 But, this reading of the numbers is misleading. First,
these numbers do not tell us how many potential plaintiffs chose not to
file their claims because of the chilling effect of the trilogy and
increased use of summary judgment. 98 In other words, the percentage
92. Id. at 1031.
93. See id. at 1032 (discussing how summary judgment can help screen out weak or
unsupported positions from litigation).
94. See id. ("If judges were consistently to take an active role in litigation ... as legal arbiters
who exercise influence over the merits by granting partial summary judgment more liberally ...
this would be a step in the right direction, stripping unsupported positions of much of their
settlement value.").
95. Id.; see also Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE
L.J. 27, 44 (2003) ("The summary judgment mechanism ... forc[es] parties to focus on the merits
of their positions . . . .").
96. See supra Parts L.A and I.B and accompanying notes (analyzing the FJC studies).
97. See supra Parts L.A and I.B and accompanying notes (discussing the general trends in
summary judgment filing and grant rates).
98. For a similar critique of an FJC study in the context of pleading, see Lonny Hoffman,
Twombly and Iqbal's Afeasure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center's Study of Motions
to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 28-30 (2012). For a response from the FJC to Hoffmann and
others' critique of this study, see Joe S. Cecil, Of Waves and Water: A Response to Comments on
the FJC Study Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim after Iqbal (Mar. 19, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=202
6103. Cecil's response notes that the FJC. in response to a request from the Standing Committee
on the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure, is proposing a new "comprehensive and
collaborative" study examining the effect of dispositive motions, including the motion to dismiss
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of summary judgment motions filed and granted may have stayed the
same, but that does not indicate how many fewer cases were filed in
total after the trilogy. Moreover, the data does not tell us whether those
motions were properly filed, and more importantly, whether they were
properly granted. We simply cannot know by looking at these raw
numbers whether the cases are being decided correctly.
Another issue with the FJC studies is how they attempt to explain
away increases in grant rates within particular substantive areas. In the
Trends in Summary Judgment Practice study, the authors suggested that
the increase in grant rates in civil rights cases may have been due to the
volume of cases filed in that area more generally.99 In the Estimates of
Summary Judgment Activity in Fiscal Year 2006 study, the authors
noted the high numbers of grant rates in employment discrimination
cases, but explained that those districts require alternative dispute
resolution before the filing of the summary judgment motion.100 The
authors of the study seem to suggest that because of this requirement,
many of the meritorious cases settle and are not brought to the summary
judgment stage.' 0 '
As to the volume increase in substantive areas as a way to explain the
increase in grant rates, the number could also be viewed as representing
a bias toward those types of claims. Regardless of whether the volume
of those kinds of cases increased or not, the number of motions filed
and granted has increased over time to a level that is far above other
substantive areas. The Trends in Summary Judgment Practice study
found that filing rates for summary judgment motions increased most in
civil rights cases and found that grant rates for civil rights cases were
similarly higher than other substantive areas (i.e., 60% in civil rights
cases versus 4 0% in torts cases).102 The volume of claims made in the
substantive area might explain in part why the rates increased, but it
does not explain away the overall increase or render that increase
and summary judgment. Id. (manuscript at 49).
99. Cecil et al., supra note 10, at 885 ("[I]ncreases in summary judgment activity overall may
reflect the growing proportion of cases in which summary judgment has always been common,
such as civil rights cases, rather than a broad shift in summary judgment practice across all
cases.").
100. Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort to Hon. Michael Baylson, supra note 31, at
2 ("Some of the districts with high rates of motions granted [for employment discrimination
cases] also have ADR procedures that resolve many cases before a summary judgment motion is
filed.").
101. Id.
102. See Cecil et al.. supra note 10, at 885 fig.4. 887 fig.6 (comparing changes in tort and civil
rights caseloads over time and outcomes in summary judgment motions by defendants,
respectively).
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innocuous. Similarly problematic is the argument that the percentages
of motions granted might be skewed by requiring ADR before the filing
of a summary judgment motion. 103 It could be argued that the cases
that do not settle might be the most meritorious because the plaintiff is
willing to take a chance at summary judgment (and perhaps get to trial)
instead of the certainty of settlement. Moreover, there is at least a fair
question about whether ADR mechanisms are fair to plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases; thus, the notion that districts require
that procedure might be alarming on that ground alone. 104
This is not to say that only the supportive summary judgment
empirical work has its issues. To the contrary, while the Scott v. Harris
study is important, it is by its own terms only a modest study.'0 5 It uses
a relatively small sample size, and it only looked at one particular
summary judgment case. 106 Like the FJC studies, we can learn a lot
from it, but we cannot know how common "cognitive illiberalism" is
and whether it is problematic in the vast majority of summary judgment
cases.
There are problems with the theoretical work as well. One of the
major problems with much of the scholarship critical of summary
judgment is its reliance on a selection of cases to support its arguments.
For example, in Elizabeth Schneider's article regarding gender and
summary judgment, she relies on a sampling of cases to support her
thesis.107 Her piece is incredibly well researched, but even she
acknowledges that she cannot draw "empirical conclusions."los She can
only offer a taste of what she believes is happening in the civil justice
system-a taste she can only show by sampling cases that demonstrate
her argument. Similarly, in my article Vanishing Plaintiff, while I
absolutely believe in the veracity of my arguments, my only proof was a
103. Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort to Hon. Michael Baylson, supra note 31, at
1 2 (outlining the scope of the summary judgment activity summary).
104. See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment
Discrimination Law. 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 395, 399 (1999) (questioning whether
employment discrimination claims are an appropriate substantive area for resolution through
arbitration).
105. See Kahan et al., supra note 38, at 905-06 (asserting Scott may create another view of
the "reasonable person" as it pertains to juries).
106. The study showed the video to 1350 individuals. Id. at 854.
107. Schneider, supra note 61, at 736 54.
108. Id. at 736 ("The cases that follow are a rich source of information on judicial decision
making: not empirical data to be sure, but more than anecdotal evidence, more than what District
Judge Lee Rosenthal, Chair of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, has
called 'anecdata."').
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sampling of cases demonstrative of my perspective-hardly an
empirically-satisfying foundation.109
The scholarship that is supportive of summary judgment is similarly
unreliable. First, it focuses on substantive areas where proponents
argue that summary judgment can work particularly well. For example,
Schwarzer, in his article Summary Judgment and Case Management,
highlights how the process functions effectively in antitrust."1o He
notes that "[s]ummary judgment analysis in antitrust cases requires the
identification of issues that are either dispositive or pivotal and do not
turn on disputed evidentiary facts," and concludes that many antitrust
cases lend themselves well to the summary judgment process.' But,
the rules are trans-substantive. An arguably beneficial use and result in
one substantive area does not necessarily justify the use of the
procedure across all substantive areas if it is otherwise failing.
And, like the theoretical work that is critical of summary judgment,
the work that is supportive of it does not rely on consistent data. At
best, the argument that summary judgment creates efficiencies is
anecdotal. In their article, Kozel and Rosenberg use numeric examples
to back up their argument that a mechanism like mandatory summary
judgment would create greater efficiencies. 112  Their work, while
compelling, is hypothetical; it has not been otherwise tested on parties
that file actual cases.113 Similarly, in his piece, Brunet argues that there
is a "summary judgment premium" because if the summary judgment
motion is denied, the settlement value will be higher for the plaintiff.114
The consequence of this, Brunet argues, is that this "premium" deters
defendants from bringing frivolous summary judgment motions.115
This is an interesting point, and while there might be fairly universal
agreement that the consequence of a summary judgment motion impacts
109. Coleman, supra note 63 (manuscript at 35-38. 41-45).
110. Schwarzer, supra note 82, at 222-28 (summarizing the application of summary judgment
in various antitrust cases).
111. Id. at 222 23.
112. See Kozel & Rosenberg. supra note 86. at 1862 (modeling the behavior of parties in a
class action where the plaintiffs' claims are assumed to be frivolous).
113. Kozel and Rosenberg employ various hypothetical scenarios to demonstrate their model.
Id at 1857-67.
114. Brunet, supra note 76, at 700 ("The denial of a summary judgment request seems to set
up a real probability that the case will proceed to a risky and costly trial. What this effectively
does is to help the plaintiff collect a greater dollar amount than would be possible without the
motion.").
115. See id. at 700-01 ("The prudent defendant has the incentive to file Rule 56 motions that
are probable winners to avoid paying this premium. These dynamics efficiently deter the filing of
any low-quality summary judgment motions .... .).
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settlement values, there is no way to test whether and how that impact
affects defendant behavior before filing the motion. Brunet also argues
that the summary judgment motion creates a "wake-up" moment for the
judge, forcing her to engage when she otherwise might not.116 Again,
this is an interesting point, and it may be true, but there is no evidence
to back it up. Stated differently, to my knowledge, there are no studies
to show that the time spent on summary judgment motions creates more
time for other cases; that the parties are efficient when it comes to
settlement because of summary judgment; or that the judge engages
because of summary judgment. All of these arguments, while
interesting and perhaps true, are not proven by simply making the
statement, nor are they proven by looking at one or two cases.
IV. How WE CAN DETERMINE WHAT WE OUGHT To KNow
Where does this leave us? Well, it is probably not quite as bad as this
Essay has made it out to be. As already stated, the body of work about
summary judgment is generally rigorous and quite good. The point here
is that as scholars and policymakers, we need to be careful about
extracting too much from what has been said. If we want to have an
argument about whether summary judgment is efficient, we need to
study that issue in a way that will give us a reliable answer. Perhaps we
could study how much time judges spend resolving the motions, or even
how much time the parties spend preparing for the motions. This would
be a difficult study to conduct, but it would give us much better
information about the alleged efficiencies of summary judgment.
In a similar vein, if we are going to argue that the process is unfair,1 17
we need to find a way to more carefully study whether that is true. This
might involve a volume of work that makes such a study too onerous.
But, it seems possible that such a study could be designed. For
example, a sampling of cases where summary judgment was granted
could be gathered, along with the supporting motions and evidence. A
broad swath of scholars and judges could then weigh in on whether the
motions were decided "correctly."' 18 If anything, that study might tell
116. See id. at 696. 703 (arguing that something needs to happen "to activate the court who
supposedly is a judicial manager").
117. See supra Part II.A (summarizing critiques of post-trilogy summary judgment use, which
have focused on how summary judgment can make courts unfairly pro-defendant).
118. See Mark Spottswood. Evidence-Based Litigation Reform 51-54 (Florida State
University College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 554, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1937787 (analogizing to studies done in the
medical malpractice context to argue that studies that assess the accuracy of cases after-the-fact
will provide better insight into the value of procedural innovations and lead to better procedural
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us the ways in which we disagree on how the rule is applied. At most,
such a study might allow us to assess whether summary judgment works
fairly in practice.119
In short, we need to do the work necessary to answer these questions
head on. Without better indicators of how summary judgment is
working, neither those who support it nor those who criticize it can
validly assess the procedure. We can learn a lot from the impressive
body of work that has been done so far, but it does not tell us
everything.
Finally, we must also acknowledge the degree to which some of this
information is unknowable. As to that point, the debate about summary
judgment then needs to become far more transparent. We cannot
continue to use what we think we know to back up our arguments about
what, as a matter of policy, we think is right. In other words, it is not
enough to point to one case (or even a few cases) where summary
judgment may have been improvidently granted, and argue that the
whole summary judgment regime is wrong.120  Similarly, it is not
enough to have a perception that the summary judgment motion creates
a moment where the parties and the judge engage and use that
perception to argue that summary judgment is efficient. 121
The scholarship discussed in this Essay is certainly not as one-
dimensional as just described. As discussed, the scholars doing this
work have acknowledged the limitations of their findings. Even with
those limitations, however, the debate continues to be framed as a
binary one between efficiency and fairness. And, to that end, all of the
scholarship and empirical work discussed has taken some amount of
liberty in drawing conclusions from less-than-perfect data toward an
rules).
119. A related, but different, approach might be to select a collection of key cases that
survived summary judgment before the Court decided the trilogy in 1986-cases that a broad
group of scholars agree are integral to our understanding of the law. This might be a difficult
consensus to reach, but assuming it could be, scholars could then assess whether those cases
would survive a summary judgment motion today. and if not, whether and how society would
have suffered without those cases. Such an exercise might help to focus the discussion more
critically on the potential losses and benefits of our summary judgment regime. See Brooke D.
Coleman, What If?: A Study of Seminal Cases as ifDecided in Twombly/lqbal Regime. 90 OR. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
1916832 (engaging in a similar exercise in the context of pleading rules under Twombly and
Iqbal). An additional way to test the worth of new procedural rules might also include running
"randomized controlled trials" before the rules are implemented. Spottswood, supra note 118, at
38-40.
120. See supra Part 111 (critiquing existing scholarship critical of summary judgment).
121. See supra Part III (critiquing existing scholarship that argues summary judgment has
increased efficiency in the legal system).
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"efficient" or "unfair" conclusion. This is, of course, what scholars
do-draw conclusions from the information we have. However, this
Essay is meant to challenge the way the debate has been framed in the
summary judgment context by pointing out that there might be ways to
get better information in order to have a more productive debate.
Further, if such information does not exist or is not knowable, then
perhaps the nature of the debate needs to change altogether. If that is
the case, then the real question is not so much about the efficiency or
fairness of the summary judgment process, but really just about one
critical issue-the jury trial. Regardless of what the data might tell us,
the bottom line is that one either has great faith in the value of the jury
trial or one does not. And maybe that is where the debate about
summary judgment should start and end.
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